suitable foreign trade and investment partners will be able to make ever better "first cuts" before arranging meetings and trying to work out deals. In making its choice of whether to conclude a deal with some foreign partner or return to the domestic market, a firm must consider the quality of its match with the foreign partner in addition to the conventional gains from trade generated by cost differentials and conventional barriers to trade such as trade taxes. As the difference between foreign and domestic match quality narrows with improving information, the relative influence of cost differentials and trade taxes on firm decisions grows. In other words, decisions by firms whether to demand domestic or foreign goods and (indirectly) demand domestic or foreign factors of production will become more responsive to cost differentials and trade taxes as information improves. Focusing on cost differentials, we can predict that the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods or between domestic and foreign factors will increase with better first-cut quality.
In this paper we will concentrate on the general-equilibrium elasticity of substitution, the reciprocal of which is computed by varying the domestic endowment of a factor of production (labor) relative to the foreign endowment and observing the change in the foreign factor price (wage) relative to the domestic factor price. This allows us to stay as close as possible to conventional general-equilibrium trade models and to analyze the key issue of international labor market integration. In a penultimate section, however, we will also analyze the partialequilibrium elasticity of substitution computed by varying the price of foreign relative to domestic goods and observing the change in the demand for domestic relative to foreign output.
As a direct consequence of the increased general-equilibrium elasticity of substitution between national labor forces, national labor markets become more integrated in the sense that an increase in one country's labor supply has more nearly equal proportionate effects on its wages and those in its trading partner. Wages in the two countries therefore tend to move together more as information improves. A separate result is that the extent to which reduction of ad valorem trade taxes or "ice" transport costs equalizes relative national wages increases. Since the volume of trade is increasing in first-cut quality, trade tax changes have a greater impact on wages when the initial volume of trade is greater, all else equal. As information becomes "perfect," the general-equilibrium elasticity of substitution becomes infinite, and our results on integration and trade liberalization converge to those of both the 2 X 2 Heckscher-OhlinSamuelson model and the standard one-good, two-factor model of trade in factor services that our model generalizes.
In the next section we present our simple general-equilibrium model. In Section II we solve the model and work out its basic comparative statics. Section III contains our results on improved information and labor market integration, and Section IV examines the interaction between improved information and ad valorem trade barriers. In Section V we adapt our model to analyze the Armington elasticity of substitution between domestic production and imports that plays such an important role in applied general-equilibrium trade models and in international macroeconomics. In our concluding section we discuss the implications of our results.
I. The Model
We investigate the potential impact of improved first-cut quality using the standard onegood, two-factor, two-country model of trade in factor services, augmented by introduction of a matching problem between entrepreneur-firms ("producers").3 Wage differentials guide producers in the labor-scarce country to seek matches in the labor-abundant country, such as joint venture partners who know how to adapt the industry technology to local conditions or land developers of sites with access to the ap- 
A. Endowments and Technology
The world is composed of two countries, home and foreign. In each country, there is a continuum of types of producers distributed over a circle of unit length.4 For each type, there is a continuum of producers of unit mass. The producers can therefore be said to lie on a "unit cylinder." Each country is also endowed with a homogeneous, inelastically supplied mass of internationally immobile labor. Since there is an equal mass, one, of producers in both countries, the ratio of labor-producer endowment ratios across countries can be summarized by the ratio L/L*, where L is the home labor endowment and L* is the foreign labor endowment. In all that follows, asterisks will be used to indicate foreign variables. We assume that the foreign country is the labor-abundant country, so that L/L* < 1.
Output is generated through a joint venture of two producers, and the distance between their types on the circle is an index of their complementarity or the gains from trade that result from their matching. To actively engage in production, a partnership needs to hire labor; thus output is a function of the quality of the producers' match and the labor employed:
where Ziy is the shortest arc distance between the two producers of types i and j, and x is labor. Note that the maximum value of zij is V2. The function F is characterized by constant returns to scale. Producers want to maximize profits. They take the wage rate w as given. With a constant 4The use of a circle of types in international trade models was popularized by Elhanan Helpman (1981) . The continuum assumption facilitates comparative static analysis, just as in Rudiger Dornbusch et al. (1977). returns to scale production function, total profits from the match of types i and j can be written as:
where the function 7r(w) is decreasing and convex in w. For ease of later proofs, let us also assume that wr(w) is a constant elasticity function (as would be the case, for example, if the technology were Cobb-Douglas). The labor demand generated by a partnership is given by:
where the prime sign indicates the first derivative.
B. Domestic and International Matching
The timing of the model is the following. First, home country producers travel to the foreign country, where foreign producers await them. Each home producer meets with one and only one potential foreign partner. Next, the type of one's partner is revealed,5 successful matches are confirmed and unsuccessful ones are broken. Finally, home and foreign producers who have rejected their international matches establish domestic partnerships with other home and foreign producers, respectively, whose international matches were also unsuccessful. The home and foreign labor markets clear when all demands for labor, from domestic and international ventures, are received.
Given the model timing, we must find the outcome of domestic matching before we can solve for the results of international matching. Domestic matching proceeds as follows. Each producer selects a partner. If his choice does not select him, he gets zero. If his choice does select him, the two producers form a match and bargain over the surplus. If the bargaining breaks down, both producers get zero. Hence the surplus equals the total value of the match. We use the Nash bargaining solution, so any pair of producers that forms a match will divide the S We shall see shortly that the threat point in international bargaining is the same for all types within a country, so it is not clear that anything could be gained by misrepresenting one's type if this were possible. total match value equally between them. We assume that every producer knows at least the domestic location of his best match type. In this case it seems natural to focus on the efficient equilibrium in which each producer selects the producer opposite him on the circle (and at the same height on the cylinder). This is an equilibrium since no producer has an incentive to change his behavior after he has chosen and been chosen by his perfect complement. In this equilibrium zij = 1/2 for every partnership. Domestic partnerships are assumed to have access to domestic labor only. Since each producer receives half of the profits, a home producer forming a domestic partnership earns (1/2) (V2)tr(w) = 7r(w)/4. Similarly, a foreign producer forming a domestic partnership earns 7r(w*)/4. We now turn to international matching. We assume that travel of home country producers to the foreign country is costless, and hence only consider equilibria in which all home country producers attempt the foreign market. Each home country producer draws a potential foreign partner from a distribution over the circle of types that is uniform with support of length k E (0, 1] and has its median at the producer's opposite type (see Figure 1) .6 k thus serves as an index of first-cut quality, with home producers effectively able to rule out the worst 100(1 -k) percent of foreign types in advance: decreasing k measures improved information. International partnerships differ from domestic partnerships in two ways. First, an international partnership has the option to locate its operation in either country and can therefore have access to the labor force of either country. Second, the producer that manages the international joint venture from abroad loses a fraction t or t* E (0, 1) of his profits. This reflects the transportation costs and trade taxes incurred when repatriating profits in terms of the numeraire good. Inclusion of trade taxes means that t or t* can be varied by unilateral government action, which will allow us to use our model to analyze the impact of a government decision to (partially) liberalize or to further restrict trade.7
C. International Bargaining
If both domestic markets are active, the threat points in international bargaining of every home and every foreign producer are ir(w)/4 and ,r(w*)/4, respectively, where w and w* are the international trade equilibrium wages.8 It is then easy to see that partners in any confirmed international match will choose to locate their operation and employ labor in the low-wage country, even if the partner in the low-wage country would have lost a smaller fraction of his profits upon repatriation from the high-wage 7 Just as in conventional trade models, the "melting ice" model of transportation costs is nothing more than a convenient simplification and "transportation costs" is an elastic concept that might include expenses of managing an operation in another country other than the cost of transporting goods. Our results are invariant to the division of the lost profits between tax revenue collected by the government and "melting" that is lost to society. (This division would become an issue if we were to analyze welfare.) 8 Uniformly distributed, atomless producers and the symmetry of the position of every producer on the circle ensure that the height of the remaining cylinder of producers in each country is the same for every type and thus domestically every producer can still match with his opposite type. The assumption that both domestic markets are active rules out self-confirming equilibria in which all producers anticipate that all other producers will confirm their international matches regardless of quality, leaving no domestic partners available. country (due to lower trade taxes, for example). If the operation were located in the high-wage country, the partner from the low-wage country would have to receive more than half of the profits from the partnership to do as well as with a domestic partner, but then the partner from the high-wage country must do strictly worse than with a domestic partner. From the point of view of the partner from the high-wage country, then, the attraction of international matching is access to cheaper labor, whereas from the point of view of the partner from the low-wage country, the attraction is greater relative bargaining power than with a domestic partner.
It is now clear that the home country cannot be the low-wage country. If it were, international partnerships would demand only home labor, and demand for home labor would be relatively greater than demand for foreign labor, generating a contradiction given that supply of home labor is relatively smaller. We can also rule out w = w*, since in this case because of the tax/transport cost at least one partner of an international match must do strictly worse than with a domestic partner and no international matches would be confirmed, yielding equal demand for home and foreign labor but a greater supply of the latter. It follows that in equilibrium w > w* and that all confirmed international matches will employ foreign labor. International matching thus serves to transfer labor demand from the labor-scarce to the laborabundant country, just as does trade in the standard one-good, two-factor model. Also as in this standard model, we can think of producers and workers as using their income to purchase their own production, generating balanced international trade of producer services for numeraire output.
We Figure 1 . We see that g(w*/w, t) is increasing in both arguments, as we would expect: the larger is w*/w, the smaller are the gains from trade and the greater must be the minimum acceptable match quality, and the larger is t, the larger is the conventional barrier to trade and the greater must be the minimum acceptable match quality. The key feature of our search and bargaining model is that some home producers draw foreign producers that yield match quality z -z and then return home, with both the home and foreign parties to the failed international matches finding domestic partners instead. This is consistent with the considerable heterogeneity that exists at the firm level regarding involvement in foreign transactions. Only a minority of firms even in high-wage countries like the United States have investments abroad, and in all countries studied many firms that produce tradeable goods have zero exports (Mark J. Roberts and James R. Tybout, 1997; Andrew B. Bernard and Bradford J. Jensen, 1999).9 The result that some firms that search abroad return home empty-handed would also be obtained in a dynamic search model with an increasing marginal cost of search, but both the closeness to standard static trade models and tractability would be reduced.10
II. International Trade Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
Both home and foreign labor markets must clear in international trade equilibrium. To find these market clearing conditions we must derive the demands for home and foreign labor. Before doing so, two preliminary steps will help to prove and build intuition for later results.
9 Clearly some of these firms attempted the foreign market. Swedish Trade Council export consultant Kent Goldmann (quoted in William E. Nothdurft, 1992, p. 32) stated of his clients that are marginal or failed exporters: "Sometimes their product isn't right for the market, or the country they chose was not a good fit, or their approach or agents are not right."
'O Why should the marginal cost of search be increasing? In order to judge the quality of a match with a foreign producer a manager must be intimately familiar with his own firm's operations, and thus involved in them. If he travels abroad for a week, say, someone can cover for him, but the longer he is absent the more crucial and pressing are the unmade decisions that pile up. In other words, the opportunity cost of the manager's time is increasing. First, we saw in the previous section that w* < w in any equilibrium of our model, but equation (4) actually yields a tighter restriction on the relationship of wages in international trade equilibrium. We see that no international partnerships can be successful if w*/w -(1 -t) 16, since that would imply z > /2. For the remainder of this analysis we will assume that endowments are sufficiently different or the tax/ transport cost is sufficiently low that an equilibrium with positive international trade always obtains.11 It follows that (1 -t)11 --= o < 1 is an upper bound for w*/w. We also see from equation (4) Second, it builds intuition to compute the probability that any international partnership will be successful. From Figure 1 we see that this is given by 2 -z(w*/w, t) (6) P= k2
As expected, the probability of success is higher when the wage ratio is smaller, when the tax/ transport cost decreases (holding the wage ratio constant), and when information improves (again holding the wage ratio constant). Also note that the sensitivity of P to both the wage ratio and the tax/transport cost is greater when first-cut quality is greater (k is smaller). This indicates the ability of producers to respond more effectively to price-based incentives as a result of improved information. Specifically, equation (6) =(-Foreign labor demand is easily shown to be decreasing in the wage ratio and tax/transport cost as expected.12 In the last line of equation (7') we introduce a new quantity, Q, which equals the profits from all successful international partnerships. In other words, Q is the same as the second integral in equation (7') if we replace (-7r'(w*)) by nr(w*). Since 7r(w*) factors out of the integral, we can recover the labor demand integral if we take the derivative of the negative of Q with respect to w*.
Given equations (7) and (7'), we can write the labor market clearing conditions as:
where we used the fact that the mass of home producers equals one and applied the definition of P in the last line. Note that we used the symmetry of the problem to integrate over only half the interval in Figure 1 , dividing by k 2 instead of k. As expected, home labor demand is increasing in the wage ratio and the tax/ transport cost: as either increases, the share of international matches that is successful falls. Foreign labor demand is the sum of labor demand by foreign producers whose international matches were unsuccessful and labor demand from successful international partnerships: We can now perform comparative statics analysis. Consider an increase in L. Equation (9) immediately yields that w*/w increases. The intuition is that the wage ratio increases to maintain labor market clearing in the home country (fewer international matches are successful). Equation (8') indicates that the foreign wage must fall, and both of these facts imply that the home wage must fall as well. Conversely, an increase in L* also causes both wages to fall, but with a decrease in the wage ratio. We thus see that with imperfect information (k > 0) national labor markets are partially integrated in the sense that, although an increase in either country's labor supply causes both its wage and that of its trading partner to fall, its wage falls more. In the next section we will show that the extent of labor market integration increases monotonically with first-cut quality.
As expected, w* decreases and w increases (and thus the wage ratio falls) with increasing k or t: The proofs of these inequalities, as well as the explicit expressions for the coefficients, are relegated to an Appendix available upon request.
We next show that, as either type of trade barrier increases (either first-cut quality decreases or the tax/transport cost increases), the volume of trade decreases, as expected. In our model the volume of trade equals profits repatriated by home country producers. The following Lemma will be an important input to our proof.
LEMMA: The probability of a successful match P decreases as either k or t increases.
PROOF:
The results follow from Proposition 2 and the last line of equation (7). Since w increases with k or t, it must be that P decreases, in either case, to keep labor demand constant. PROPOSITION 3: The volume of trade decreases as either k or t increases.
Since from Proposition 2 we have dw/dk > 0 and dw/dt > 0, it suffices to show that the total profits from international partnerships Q decrease as either k or t increases, because the weakening of the bargaining position of home country producers means the profits they obtain from international partnerships decrease even more. Consider an increase in k. We know from Proposition 2 and the Lemma that both w* and P go down, both thereby contributing to an increase in the demand for foreign labor according to the last line of equation (7'). Since the foreign labor market must still clear, it must be that -aQ/3w* (which is a positive quantity) decreases. Since the expression for Q is proportional to Tr(w*), it can be written as Q = C(w*) -, where C does not depend on w* and -s is the constant elasticity of profits with respect to the wage rate. Then -aQ/aw* = Cs(w*) l 1 = sQ/w*, and since w* is decreasing it must be that Q itself decreases with k. The proof for the case when t increases is exactly analogous.
We conclude this section by proving our first "convergence" result: in the limit as information becomes perfect (k approaches zero), the ratio of national wages becomes a function of only the tax/transport cost and technology, as in the 2 X 2 Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model and the standard one-good, two-factor model of trade in factor services. In particular, the ratio of national wages becomes independent of the ratio of national labor supplies. To see this, note that as k approaches zero, to approaches w. Since w is positive for k < 12, it follows from Proposition 1 that there is a solution for the wage ratio w*/w G (w_, &>). In the limit, we must have w*/w = =_ (1 -t)l1/, and the wage ratio depends only on the tax/transport cost and on production technology (which determines e). The wage ratio achieves its upper bound because with perfect information the maximum transfer of labor demand from the home to the foreign country occurs.
III. Information and Labor Market Integration
As stated in the introduction, we expect the elasticity of substitution between national labor forces to increase as informational barriers to trade fall. We can now demonstrate this result formally. Define the relevant elasticity as Using this expression, we can immediately see that suppressing the dependence of z on w*/w yields (7GE = 8 + 1: eliminating the impact of the wage ratio on the probability of forming a successful international partnership, and thus on the transfer of labor demand between countries, yields a "base" value of the elasticity of substitution that must rise when that impact is factored in. Proposition 4 shows that the extent to which the substitutability of national labor forces exceeds this base value increases as firstcut quality improves, and that this substitutability becomes perfect as information becomes perfect.
PROPOSITION 4: c GE> e + 1, arGE decreases with k, and trGE --oo as k -> 0.
PROOF:
The equilibrium wage ratio w*/w is calculated with the help of equation (9), which we repeat here: Finally, we showed at the end of Section II that in the limit as k approaches zero w*/w = C) (=C )). The third term of the expression for aGE thus tends to infinity as k tends to zero, completing the proof.
Since the value of the elasticity of substitution between national labor forces is infinite in the 2 X 2 Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model and in the standard one-good, two-factor model of trade in factor services, Proposition 4 contains our second convergence result.
A higher elasticity of substitution means that firms are able to transfer labor demand more effectively between countries in response to the opportunities presented by wage differentials, thereby reducing the extent to which relative wages need to change when relative labor supplies change in order for national labor markets to clear. Figure 3 illustrates this aspect of increasing labor market integration as information improves. As k falls from 1 to 0.01, home producers begin unable to rule out any foreign types in advance and end able to rule out the worst 99 percent in advance. We see that for minimum first-cut quality the home wage falls by less than 1 percent and the foreign wage falls by more than 4 percent in response to a 10-percent increase in foreign labor supply, but as first-cut quality increases these changes both converge towards the perfectly integrated world labor market value and the (8)]. We can think of this elasticity as a partial-equilibrium magnitude, as would be typical in labor economics, or 14 The initial value of L/L* in this simulation is /2, so the world labor supply increases by 6 2/3 percent. The value of e is 1, yielding an autarky labor demand elasticity of -2, so in a perfectly integrated world labor market the world wage should fall by 3 1/3 percent (actually about 3.175 percent once we correct for linear approximation error). The value of t in this simulation is zero. producers does not change. 16 In the case where the home country is small relative to the foreign country, we must instead state that the home labor demand per producer is expressed in proportion to the foreign labor supply per producer. 17 The value of E in Figure 4 is 1, as in Figure 3 , but the value of t is 0.1, its (initial) value in Figure 5 below. It follows that when w/w* falls to 1/0.9 (w*/w rises to 0.9 = (1 -t)l/e) the home country is in zero-trade equilibrium, so that labor demand is the same regardless of the value of k. The reader can easily compute that, for e = 1, the value of L/L* for which t = 0.1 is a "prohibitive" tax/transport cost is (0.9)1 + l/e = 0.81. 
The proof of this proposition is more involved than the proofs of our other propositions, and is confined to the Appendix. Figure 5 shows Proposition 5 in action. The value of s is 1, so the increase in w*/w in response to a 10-percent increase in T must approach 10 percent as k approaches 0. We also see in Figure  5 that for minimum first-cut quality the wage ratio only increases by about 2 1/ percent. This equalization of wages in response to trade liberalization is brought about more by a fall in the home wage than by an increase in the foreign wage, reflecting the larger size of the foreign labor force.18 18 The value of L/L* in this simulation is 1/2 and the initial value of T is 0.9 (t = 0.1).
Since from Proposition 5 we already know that w*/w changes less in response to a change in T as k increases, we can expect that if we hold w* constant w will change less in response to a change in T as k increases. Just as in our analysis of the elasticity of domestic labor demand e(Ld, w), we can hold w* constant by making the home country "small" relative to the foreign country, or consider our analysis to be of the partial-rather than general-equilibrium variety. Rauch Standard small-country analysis of ad valorem trade taxes/transport costs, in both the 2 x 2 Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model and the one-good, two-factor model of trade in factor services that our model generalizes, demonstrates that the percentage change in domestic wages equals the percentage change in T multiplied by a coefficient that is determined only by the underlying production technology.19 The fact that this property holds in our model as information becomes perfect is our final "convergence" result.
We know from Proposition 3 that the volume of trade increases with first-cut quality. Our result on e(w, T) therefore implies that the impact of trade liberalization on domestic wages will be greater, the greater is the initial volume of trade, holding constant all parameters other than first-cut quality, including the initial level of the tax/transport cost and all characteristics of the trading partner.
V. The Armington Elasticity of Substitution
The elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported outputs, known as the Armington elasticity of substitution, is a key parameter in both econometric and simulation models that are used to assess the likely effects of various trade policies (see, e.g., Rajesh Chadha et al., 1998). It also plays an important role in inter- We propose a different approach to this problem. We assume that imported and domestic outputs are distinguished only by place of production, i.e., they are perfect substitutes in consumer or producer demand. Finite Armington elasticities of substitution nevertheless obtain because of matching friction with foreign suppliers. Complete specialization in production can arise, but only if the price differential between imported and domestic outputs is great enough to overcome the "natural protection" offered by the informational barrier to trade. With incomplete specialization, we expect Armington elasticities of substitution to rise as first-cut quality (information) improves.
We can demonstrate these results using the model of Sections I and II after some reinterpretation of the agents and variables. We begin by reinterpreting "producers" as wholesalers engaged in both domestic distribution and import-export activities. Instead of purchasing "labor," wholesalers purchase goods from manufacturers, and "wages" can then be interpreted as producer prices and relabeled p and p*, respectively. Wholesaler "types" can be interpreted as reflecting their (possibly contractual) affiliations with certain manufacturers and end users (retailers or purchasers of intermediate goods). Match quality is then increasing in the suitability of the product varieties supplied by the underlying manufacturers for the end users the wholesalers wish to serve. Equation (1) now gives the production function for wholesale services for a given industry. The assumption that product varieties are identical across countries (perfect substitutes in demand) is reflected by the fact that the location of any wholesaler's best match is identical across countries and yields an identical match quality. The model can implicitly allow for variation in the degree of product differentiation within an industry by changing the exponent on zij in a Cobb-Douglas specification of the production function F: the greater is this exponent, the more important is match quality as a component of wholesale services, indicating a greater level of product differentiation in the industry. It is easily shown that this implies a smaller elasticity of the profit function in equation (2) with respect to the producer price p, leading to a smaller "base" elasticity of substitution. Conversely, the more "commodified" is the industry, the more price sensitive are the profits of the wholesalers that work in it.
We will assume that all product varieties within an industry are symmetric, hence p and p* represent the producer prices of every product variety in the respective countries.20 Aggregating units across all goods within the industry, equations (7) and (7') then give the demands for domestic industry output and foreign industry output, respectively. Let us define imports M as that part of demand for foreign industry output generated by international matches, i.e., goods purchases of internationally matched foreign wholesalers from their affiliated manufacturers for resale by their partner home wholesalers to their affiliated end users. Moreover, co decreases with k and p*/lp is given exogenously, so oA decreases with k.
Blonigen and Wilson (1999) examine the determinants of estimated Armington elasticities between U.S. domestic and imported goods across over 100 industrial sectors from 1980-1988. They find evidence in support of their hypothesis that "more efficient distribution of the import good makes it easier for the consumer to substitute to these products" (p. 9). This is also consistent with our Proposition 6.24
VI. Conclusions
We modeled a reduction in informational barriers to trade as allowing investors from a labor-scarce country to rule out, in advance of attempting to form a match, more of the potential partners in a labor-abundant country with which they can enter into productive joint ventures. We found that this increased first-cut quality leads to a greater general-equilibrium elasticity of substitution between national labor forces, hence greater integration of national labor markets in the sense that an increase in one country's labor supply has more nearly equal proportionate effects on its wages and those in its trading partner. A related result is that, unlike reductions in conventional trade barriers (at least in standard models), improved information has the effect predicted by Rodrik (1997) of increasing the elasticity of national labor demands.
In our model conventional trade barriers took the form of ad valorem tax/transport costs. We found that the extent to which reductions in conventional trade barriers equalize national wages increases with first-cut quality. Since in our model the volume of trade is increasing in first-cut quality, trade tax changes have a greater impact on wages when the initial volume of trade is greater, all else equal. Therefore, given that 0 < se(w*/w, T) < 1, the first two terms in equation (A2) are both negative. Suppose now that when k increases, (1 -se(w*1w, T)) is either constant or decreases, implying that e(w*/w, T) does not decrease, as we wish to prove. Because w*/w is decreasing in k, we can deduce that: 
